Sudden financial arrest by Caballero, Ricardo J.
fi
-
MIT LIBRARIES
3 9080 03317 5909
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Department of Economics
Working Paper Series
Sudden Financial Arrest
Ricardo J. Caballero
Working Paper 09-29
November 8, 2009
RoomE52-251
50 Memorial Drive
Cambridge, MA 02142
This paper can be downloaded without charge from the
Social Science Research Network Paper Collection at
httsp://ssrn.com/abstTact= 1 504985
mtm
?fV.'.ws;
Sudden Financial Arrest
Ricardo J. Caballero^
November 08, 2009
Abstract
There are striking and terrifying similarities between the sudden failure of a heart and
that of a financial system. In the medical literature, the former is referred to as a
sudden cardiac arrest (SCA). By analogy, I refer to its financial counterpart as a sudden
financial arrest (SFA). In this article I describe SFA and its treatment guided by its
medical counterpart.
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"Sudden cardiac arrest (SCA) is a condition in which the heart suddenly
and unexpectedly stops beating. When this happens, blood stops flowing
to the brain and other vital organs.... SCA usually causes death if It's not
i. treated within minutes...." (NHLBI/NIH)
,
.
.
There are striking and terrifying similarities between the sudden failure of a heart and
that of a financial system. In the medical literature, the former is referred to as a sudden
cardiac arrest (SCA). By analogy, I refer to its financial counterpart as a sudden financial
arrest [SFA).
When an economy enters an episode of SFA, panic takes over, trust breaks down, and
investors and creditors withdraw from their normal financial transactions. These
reactions trigger a chain of events and perverse feedback-loops that quickly disintegrate
the balance sheets of financial institutions, eventually dragging down even those
institutions that followed a relatively healthy financial lifestyle prior to the crisis. In this
article I draw on the parallels between SCA and SFA to characterize the latter and to
argue that a pragmatic policy framework to address SFA requires a much larger
component of systemic insurance than most policymakers and politicians are currently
willing to go along with.
An important risk factor behind SCA is coronary artery disease (CAD), and the front line
prevention for CAD is a healthy lifestyle. However, the medical profession is keenly
aware that people make poor choices regardless of warnings, and that even those who
do adopt a healthy lifestyle and have no known risk conditions may still experience a
fatal SCA episode. The pragmatic response to these facts of life is to complement
preventive healthy lifestyle guidelines and advise w/ith an effective protocol to prevent
death once SCA takes place. The main (and perhaps only) option to treat SCA once
triggered is the use of a defibrillator. Moreover, the window/ of time for this treatment
to be effective is very narrov^, just a few minutes, making it crucial to have defibrillators
readily available in as many places as is economically feasible.
Unfortunately, the pragmatic approach followed by the medical profession in reducing
the risk of death associated with SCA contrasts sharply with the stubborn reluctance to
supplement the financial equivalent of CAD-prevention type policies (mostly regulatory
requirements) with an effective //nonc/o/ defibrillator mechanism. The main antidote to
SFA is massive provision of credible public insurance and guarantees to financial
transactions and balance sheets. In this analogy, these are the financial equivalent of a
defibrillator.
, , . .
The main dogma behind the great resistance in the policy world to institutionalize a
public insurance provision is a fuzzy moral hazard argument: If the financial defibrillator
were to be implanted in an economy, the argument goes, banks and their creditors
would abandon all forms of healthy financial lifestyle and would thus dramatically
increase the chances of an SFA episode.
This moral hazard perspective is the equivalent of discouraging the placement of
defibrillators in public places because of the concern that, upon seeing them, people
would have a sudden urge to consume cheeseburgers since they would realize that their
chances of surviving an SCA had risen as a result of the ready access to defibrillators.
But actual behavior is less forward looking and rational than is implied by that logic.
People indeed consume more cheeseburgers than they should, but this is more or less
independent of whether defibrillators are visible or not. Surely, there is a need for
advocating healthy habits, but no one in their right mind would propose doing so by
making all available defibrillators inaccessible. Such policy would be both ineffective as
an incentive mechanism, and a human tragedy when an episode of SCA occurs.
By the same token, and with very few exceptions (Fannie and Freddie?), financial
institutions and investors in bullish mode make portfolio decisions which are driven by
dreams of exorbitant returns, not by distant marginal subsidies built into financial
defibrillators. Nothing is further from these investors' minds than the possibility of
(financial) death, and hence they could not ascribe meaningful value to an aid which, in
their mind, is meant for someone else. This is simply the other side of the risk-
compression and undervaluation during the boom phase. Logical coherence dictates
that if one believes in this undervaluation, then one must also believe in the near-
irrelevance of anticipated subsidies during distress for private actions during the boom.
.
Of course, once the crisis sets in, insurance acquires great value and leads to more risk-
taking and speculative capital injections into the financial system, but by then this is
mostly desirable since the main economy-wide problem during a financial panic is too
little, not too much, risk-taking. The last thing we need at this time is for creditors to
panic, and shortsellers to feast, as they suddenly realize that financial institutions can
indeed fail from self-fulfilling runs, fires sales, and liquidity dry-ups, for which there is no
counteracting policy framework in place aside from ill-timed "market discipline" or a
high-fatality risk surgery. Indeed, attempting to "resolve" a large and interconnected
institution in the middle of a panic, when asset prices are uninformative and hence
"resolution" decisions are largely arbitrary, carries the serious risk of adding fuel to the
fire (panic)."
One way to get a sense of how much the market values the "too big to fail" insurance provided by the
government is to compare the cost of funding for small and large banks. Baker and McArthur (2009)
compare the average costs of funding for banks with more than $100 billion in assets to the average costs
for banks with less than $100 billion. They find that between the first quarter of 2000 and the fourth
quarter of 2007, the large banks' costs were 0.29 percentage points lower than the small banks, averaging
across time. Between fourth quarter 2008 and second quarter 2009, the spread increased to 0.78
percentage points. Clearly, there are many reasons why larger and smaller banks can have different costs
of funding: different types of assets, different amounts of leverage, and so on. Baker and McArthur
(2009) take the difference between these spreads, 0.78 minus 0.29, as a crude upper-bound on the
subsidy associated with the solidification of the "too big to fail" policy after Lehman's collapse. I would
suggest an alternative interpretation: During boom times, the "too big to fail" insurance was there but of
little importance, while during the crisis, it became much more important and probably a source of
stability.
In any event, when SFA does take place, it becomes imnTediately apparent to pragmatic
policymal<ers that there is no other choice than to provide massive support to distressed
institutions and marl<ets, but since the channels to do so are not readily available,
precious time and resources are wasted groping for a mid-crisis response (recall the
many flip-flops during the early stages of the TARP implementation). If one is of the view
(which I am not) that hubris plays only a small role during the boom and instead it is all
about incentive problems due to anticipated subsidies during distress, then one must
believe that savvy bankers and their creditors anticipate intervention anyway. Hence the
incentive benefit of not having financial defibrillators readily available does not derive
from the absence of a well designed ex-ante policy framework but from the real risk
that improvised ex-post interventions may fail to be deployed in time to prevent death
from SFA. This logic seems contrived at best as the foundation for a policy framework
that does not include readily available financial defibrillators. : ' ,
In summary, it is a fact of life, and of cognitive distortions, financial complexity, and
innovation in particular, that SFA episodes will continue to happen regardless of how
much regulatory creativity policymakers may muster. The absence of a financial
defibrillator is a very weak incentive mechanism during the boom phase, and a potential
economic tragedy during a financial crisis. We need a more pragmatic approach to SFA
than the current monovision CAD-style, hope-for-the-best, approach. We need to
endow the policy framework with powerful financial defibrillators.
Modern economies already count on one such device in the lender of last resort facility
(LOLR) housed at the central bank, but this has clearly proven to be insufficient during
the recent crisis. I discuss three supplements to this facility:
• Self insurance, which is where policymakers' instinct lies. In the current context
this is reflected in a call for higher capital adequacy ratios, especially for
systemically important financial institutions.
• Contingent capital injections, which is where most academics' instinct lies. The
basic idea is to reduce the costs associated with holding capital when is not
needed. Proposals primarily differ on whether the contingency depends on bank-
specific or systemic events, and on whether the source of capital is external to
the distressed bank or internal (as in the debt-convertibility proposals).
• Contingent insurance injections, which is the most cost effective mechanism for
the panic component of SFA. The basic idea is that the enormous distortion in
perceived probabilities of a catastrophe during panics can be put to good use
since economic agents greatly overvalue public insurance and guarantees.
Providing these can be as effective as capital injections in dealing with the panic
at a fraction of the expected cost (when assessed at reasonable rather than
panic-driven probabilities of a catastrophe).
In practice, there are good reasons to have in place some of each of these types of
mechanisms. For normal shocks, it is probably easiest to have banks self- and cross-
insure. For large shocks, there is always a fundamental component, which is probably
best addressed immediately with contingent capital (private at first and in extreme
events, public). However, the large panic component of an SFA episode requires large
amounts of guarantees, which would be too costly and potentially counterproductive (if
they add to the fear of large dilutions) to achieve through capital injections. For this
component, a contingent-insurance policy is the appropriate response.
One particularly flexible form of a contingent insurance program is the Tradable
Insurance Credits (TlCs) proposed in Caballero and Kurlat (2009a). These TICs act as
contingent (on systemic events) CDS to protect banks' assets against spikes in
uncertainty. They are a (nearly) automatic, pre-paid, and mandated mechanism to ring-
fence assets whose price is severely affected by SFA, as it was done ex-post in the U.S. for
some Citibanl< and Bank of America assets and was offered more broadly in the U.K.^
The international dimension of SFA adds its own ingredients. 1 focus on the problem for
emerging markets which has a close parallel with the issues faced by the financial sector
within developed economies. For emerging markets, it is often the case that the
sovereign itself becomes entangled in the crisis as the main shortage is one of
international rather than (just) domestic liquidity. Most policymakers in emerging
market economies are acutely aware of this danger, which is one of the main reasons
they accumulate large amounts of international reserves. However, large accumulations
of reserves are the equivalent to self-insurance for domestic banks, and as such are
costly insurance facilities. For this reason, many of us have advocated the use of
external insurance arrangements, and the IMF has spent a significant amount of time
attempting to design the right contingent credit line facility. In this paper I propose
creating a system akin to the TICs but aimed at supporting the value of emerging market
new and legacy emerging debt during global SFA episodes. 1 refer to these instruments
as E-TICs and envision them as being controlled by the IMF rather than by the U.S. or
other developed economies' governments.'' . ' . '
In the rest of the paper I develop this line of argument in greater detail. Section II covers
the analogy between SCA and SFA. Section III focuses on financial defibrillators. Section
IV adds an international dimension to the analysis, and Section V concludes.
It turns out that the Bank of America deal was never signed, but the perception that it had been was enough to
contain the panic. The U.K. system was less successful in terms of the takers than it would have been socially
optimal because it was voluntary and very expensive. Both aspects would be improved by the TICs framework.
For developed economies, the international liquidity shortage problem is much less significant and it was
appropriately dealt with the swap arrangements between major central banks. These should remain in place, at
least on a contingent (to SFA) basis. A more delicate problem for these countries stems from the high degree of
cross-borders interconnectedness of their financial institutions and the potential arbitrage and free riding issues
that may emerge from differences in the type of financial defibrillators available. This raises international
coordination issues which I don't develop in this paper but that obviously need to be addressed.
11. An Overview of SFA . . ._
. ; .
•
In this section I characterize SFA, drawing a close financial-analogy with the health-
equivalent issues in SCA. This sets up the case for a discussion of financial defibrillators
in the next section. ""' ' ' , •
a. A. What is SFA and what are its immediate causes?
Sudden financial arrest (SFA) is a condition in wliicli trust witliin and toward tlie financial
system suddenly vanishes. When this happens, the financial system freezes and credit
stops flowing within the financial system and to the real economy. SFA causes severe
contractions and wealth destruction in the absence of an immediate systemic policy
response.
The most immediate cause is a truly unexpected event that triggers enormous confusion
(see Caballero and Kurlat 2009a). Often there is an observable shock (e.g., a real estate
crash, a sovereign default, the uncovering of a significant fraud, or a sharp decline in
terms of trade) but this shock is small relative to the observed response in some key
financial institutions and markets. It is this apparent over-reaction that triggers a self-
fulfilling confusion: Why such a large response? Are things worse than they seem? Who
is compromised? Which instruments? What are the transmission channels? How will
others react to this over-reaction? How will the government react?
These doubts by themselves bring about reluctance to engage in financial transactions
and are triggers of good old-fashioned financial multipliers, which are often sufficient
enough to cause a real contraction.
The now-classic contributions of Bernanke and Gertier (1989), Bernanke et a! (1999),
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), and others illustrate the powerful feedback channels
between asset markets and the macroeconomy. When the assets held by a leveraged
firm decrease in value, the net worth of the firm is quickly eroded, forcing the firm to
sell financial assets or decrease investment or hiring. These actions may in turn further
decrease the value of the asset. Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009a, 2009b) call this
type of feedback a "loss spiral." Loss spirals may be aggravated by fire sales, in which
market liquidity dries up because the natural holders of an asset are simultaneously
trying to sell. Such fire sales have been extensively documented, e.g., in the equity
markets (Coval and Stafford 2007), the market for airliners (Pulvino 1998), and the
convertible bond market (Mitchell, Pedersen and Pulvino 2007). Brunnermeier and
Pedersen also emphasize "margin spirals," in v^hich a reduction in firms' ability to
borrow against an asset leads to sales. Increases in haircuts - the amount of equity
needed to finance a given asset - have been dramatic in the present crisis, as Gorton
and Metrick (2009) have documented. Geanakoplos (2003, 2009), and Fostel and
Geanakoplos (2008) highlight the role of margins in a theory of "leverage cycles." In
these models, the supply and demand for loans determines not only the interest rate,
but also equilibrium leverage. News that causes increases in risk or disagreement can
shift the equilibrium haircut, with large effects on asset prices. ,:.
However, there are two key additional and related ingredients which have the potential
to leverage the consequences of these mechanisms to SFA level: Complexity and
Knightian uncertainty.
Reality is immensely more complex than models, with millions of potential weak links. Ex-
post, it is easy to highlight the one that blew up, but ex-ante is a different matter. Each
market participant and policymaker knows their own local world, but understanding all
the possible linkages across these different worlds (which are mostly irrelevant except
during a severe crisis when they turn critical) is too complex. This change in paradigm,
from irrelevant to critical linkages, triggers massive uncertainty, indeed Knightian
uncertainty (when the unknowns shift from known to unknown), and unleashes
destructive flights to quality.
In Caballero and Simsek (2009a) we capture the idea of a sudden rise in complexity,
followed by widespread panic in the financial sector. In our model, banks normally collect
basic information about their direct trading partners which serves to assure them of the
soundness of these relationships. However, when acute financial distress emerges in
parts of the financial network, it is not enough to be informed about these direct trading
partners, but it also becomes important for the banks to learn about the health of their
trading partners, in order to assess the chances of an indirect hit. And as conditions
continue to deteriorate, banks must learn about the health of the trading partners of the
trading partners, of their trading partners, and so on. At some point, the cost of
information gathering becomes too large and banks, now facing enormous uncertainty,
choose to withdraw from loan commitments and illiquid positions. A flight-to-quality
ensues, and the financial crisis spreads. In Caballero and Simsek (2009b) we show how
this complexity mechanism interacts and greatly amplifies the collateral and fire sales
mechanisms.^ - - ' .• ,
In Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2008a) we illustrate with a model and examples the
amplification role of Knightian uncertainty (and the effectiveness of "financial
defibrillation" in this context). We pointed out that most flight to quality episodes are
triggered by unusual or unexpected events. The common aspects of investor behavior
across these episodes —re-evaluation of models, conservatism, and disengagement from
risky activities— indicate that these episodes involved Knightian uncertainty (i.e.,
immeasurable risk) and not merely an increase in risk exposure. The extreme emphasis
on tail outcomes and worst-case scenarios in agents' decision rules suggests uncertainty
aversion. •
In Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2008b) we place the origins of the current crisis in this
framework. We argue that financial instruments and derivative structures underpinning
the recent growth in credit markets were complex. Indeed, perhaps the single largest
change in the financial landscape over the last five years was in complex credit products:
CDOs, CLOs, and the like. Because of the rapid proliferation of these instruments, market
Haldane (2009) masterfuliy captures the essence of the counterparty uncertainty problem that can arise in a
complex modern financial network: "...Knowing your ultimate counterparty's risk then becomes like solving a high-
dimension Sudoku puzzle...."
10
participants couldn't refer to a historical record to measure how these financial
structures would behave during a time of stress. These two factors, complexity and lack
of history, are the preconditions for rampant uncertainty. When defaults on subprime
mortgages occurred, many market participants were taken by surprise at how their
investments were reacting. Early on in the crisis, the most prominent example of this
was the losses experienced by AAA subprime tranches. It was at this point that investors
became uncertain about their investments. Had the uncertainty remained confined to
subprime mortgage investments, given the relatively small size of the subprime sector,
the financial system could have absorbed the losses without too much dislocation.
However, investors started to question the valuation of the myriad other credit products
— not just mortgages— that had been structured in much the same way as subprime
investments. The result was uncertainty and a freezing up across the entire credit
market. The policy response to this initial freezing was timid, which kept the stress on
the financial system alive until the latter eventually gave up and a full blown SFA episode
developed (after Lehman's demise).
, .
In summary, while fundamental factors are often the triggers, and hence there is good
reason to try to manage them, their potential for real damage is often contained in the
absence of SFA. Traditional financial multipliers can greatly increase the real impact of
fundamental shocks, but it is only after they are themselves amplified by widespread
panic and confusion that a deep crisis is likely to set in. Absent the panic, the financial
heart may go through a few scary arrhythmias, but there are too many safety valves and
resources in modern developed financial markets for it to come to a sustained halt.
tl.B. Who is at risk? '
Every economy with a reasonably modern financial system is at risk of SFA. It is a risk
inextricably tied to the dynamic process of financial innovation and to the complexity of
a rich financial network. As highlighted by Cabailero and Krishnamurthy (2008a), it
builds over time as untested financial innovations grow in relative importance, which is
an unavoidable side effect of a period of prosperity.
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Of course, there are factors that elevate SFA risk in addition to the mere passage of
(innovation) time. There are the usual bad habit suspects, such as a high concentration
of real estate loans in banks' balance sheets, currency and liquidity mismatches in
financially leveraged institutions, lending and consumption booms, sharp asset
appreciations, regulatory and supervisory negligence, weak corporate governance,
sustained appreciations and current account deficits, excessive exposure to terms of
trade shocks, low levels of international reserves, and so on. But unfortunately these
factors have very limited predictive power for SFA, especially in sophisticated financial
markets (see Caballero and Kurlat 2009a).
The most visible of these factors, the macroeconomic ones, play a detectable role in
emerging markets, since the strong pro-cyclicality of capital flows increases the
likelihood that large macroeconomic shocks quickly translate into SFA episodes. These
lessons have been largely learned, which explains why emerging markets did not
implode during the recent global crisis.
However, this tight connection between macroeconomic events and SFA is weak in deep
and developed financial markets. Reinhart and Reinhart (2008) find that, for low and
middle income countries, the probability of a banking crisis is higher during episodes of
"capital flow bonanza." (The probability conditional on a bonanza is 21 percent, versus
a 14 percent unconditional probability.) For high income countries, this connection is
absent in their sample.
Of course SFA is more likely to take place in the midst of a contractionary
macroeconomic shock, in the same sense that an SCA episode is more likely to take
place during a stressful situation, but this does not mean that the cause of SFA is a
macroeconomic imbalance. Instead, the main SFA risks are more silent, building slowly
over time and becoming deeply embedded in the financial network. These risks are very
12
hard to detect in time to prevent an SFA. Going back to tine analogy with SCA, I quote
again from the NHLBI/NIH site:
"The major risk factor for SCA is undiagnosed coronary artery disease (CAD). Most
people who have SCA are later found to have some degree of CAD. Most of these
people don't know that they have CAD until SCA occurs. Their CAD is "silent"—that
is, it has no signs or symptoms. Because of this, doctors and nurses have not
detected it. Most cases of SCA happen in people who have silent CAD and who have
no known heart disease prior to SCA.
"
Yes, we all knew that there could be a large correction in real estate markets and that
this would complicate subprime mortgages and lenders first, and that a recession would
surely follow a crash. But the hidden financial-CAD was not the price of real estate or
the amount of subprime mortgages. Instead, it was in the particulars of the complex
financial interconnections developed in the process of creating new financial
instruments and products. There are, of course, ample anecdotes and media-created
gurus, but these are mostly stories, where the crucial details were never part of them,
which is long and conveniently forgotten. No one can (or should) claim to have
understood before the crisis the precise channels through which complexity would turn
out the way it did. __ •' ' ,. . -, , .:'' • ; ; - v.
There is an economic parallel to the earlier hidden-CAD quote, found in the social
learning literature. Like plaque in one's circulatory system, bad news can accumulate
over time in the financial system without causing a catastrophe. Indeed, the financial
system can continue in a state of "business as usual" even as increasing numbers of
people receive bad news about fundamentals. As with plaque, it can take a critical mass
of bad news before "business as usual" turns into crisis. For CAD, the reasons have to
do with physics, but for financial-CAD, this can occur when bad news is not common
knowledge. For example, as shown by Caplin and Leahy (1994), if private information is
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revealed through irreversible actions, agents v;/ill Vi/ait until their expectations cross a
low threshold before acting upon them; this can allow bad information to accumulate
over time without any visible signs. Similarly, bubbles may persist even as large
numbers of agents learn that a bubble is occurring, if coordination is needed to burst
the bubble and if the bubble's existence is not common knowledge, as in Abreu and
Brunnermeier (2003). Such behavior is not inconsistent with rationality. As the then Citi
CEO Chuck Prince observed in July 2007, "When the music stops, in terms of liquidity,
things will be complicated. But as long as the music is playing, you've got to get up and
dance. We're still dancing." Even with the rough contours of the crisis clear in the CEO's
mind, he kept dancing, because the timing and exact contours of the crisis were not
clear.
!!.C. Diagnosis
Diagnosis is the key element in deciding how and when to react. In health matters, while
it is difficult to predict the occurrence of SCA its diagnosis is not hard, and in fact there
are machines that do it nearly automatically (more specifically, defibrillators designed
for the untrained check for severe arrhythmias before applying an electric shock to the
heart).
In economic matters, diagnosis is a much trickier task, perhaps because even when
violent, events are less abrupt than cardiac arrest. Usually SCA happens without a clear
warning sign. In contrast, there is almost always a narrow window of opportunity to
react to early warnings and prevent a full-blown SFA episode. Unfortunately, in practice
much of this advantage is wasted as a conclusive diagnosis is delayed until the evidence
is sufficiently clear to persuade reluctant politicians that emergency treatment for SFA is
needed. By then, solving the problem often is an order of magnitude more expensive
than in an early intervention. The following quote from Phillip L. Swagel (2009), then
assistant secretary for economic policy, vividly captures this reality:
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"Political constraints were an important factor in the reluctance at the Treasury
to put forward proposals to address the credit crisis early in 2008. The options
that later turned into the TARP were first written down at the Treasury in March
2008: buy assets, insure them, inject capital into financial institutions, or
massively expand federally guaranteed mortgage refinance programs to improve
asset performance from the bottom up. But we at the Treasury saw little
prospect of getting legislative approval for any of these steps, including a
massive program to avoid foreclosures. Legislative action would be possible only
when Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson and Federal Reserve Chairman Ben
Bernanke could go to Congress and attest that the crisis was at the doorstep,
even though by then it could well be too late to head it off." (Swagel, p. 4)
The bickering early on is often Schumpeterian in nature. A boom accumulates many
excesses in financial balance sheets and it is healthy that some of them are cleansed.
The problem is that the ratio of inefficient panic-contagion-driven destruction to healthy
cleansing can rise quickly. This is the policy conundrum, where to draw the line and,
even more importantly, to muster the support to act quickly once the line is crossed. If
intervention takes place too early, there is no healthy cleansing. If it takes place too late,
there is great risk of an SFA episode.
In practice, some objective measurement is needed. For SCA, electrocardiograms (EKGs)
can be used to detect and locate the source of several heart problems. For SFA, there
are many EKG-equivalents. Spreads of all sorts can be used to spot dysfunctional
financial markets and institutions. '
., ,
The blue line in Figure 1 is the VIX at market close, from the CBOE. The red line is the
TED spread, the difference between 3-mo LIBOR and 3-mo constant maturity Treasury,
both since the 1990s until the present. It is apparent that both capture well episodes of
financial turmoil. The graph shows the unprecedented degree of financial-markets
15
dislocation during the current crisis and that the level of unease was considerable well
before Lehman's collapse. The TED spread in late 2007 and early 2008 exceeded levels
associated with the Persian Gulf War, the LTCM/Russian default episode, and 9/11.
There is also a subtle but important difference between these two indicators. The VIX is
probably a good warning for SFA proclivity but it is too sensitive to determine the
occurrence of an SFA event by itself. This is not surprising since by construction the VIX
picks up distress in the riskiest segments of assets (equity). The TED, on the other hand,
reflects trouble in the safest counterparties, and hence it is a more reliable indicator
that financial chaos is in full force. • "
Figure 1. Indicators of Panic since 1990
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Figure 2 offers a bird-eye view of the crisis from the perspective of the same two
indicators of panic. Note that the TED spread soared the week of Lehman's collapse and
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retreated very sharply as the Capital Purchase Program (CPP) and Temporary Liquidity
Guarantee Program (TLGP) were announced on October 14, 2008.
Figure 2. Indicators of Panic During the Crisis
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Quantity indicators are often harder to come by in real time, but they offer a clear
indication of the extent of the damage being caused by the underlying crisis. The blue
line in Figure 3 is "New Issuance of Asset-Backed Securities in Previous 3 Months," from
Adrian and Shin (2009); the data originally come from JP Morgan Chase. ^ The crisis in
The new issuance series is the sum over the following categories of ABS: "home equity (subprime)"; commercial
real estate; autos; credit cards; student loans; non-US residential mortgages; and other. The data were provided
by Tobias Adrian.
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this market is apparent from the disappearance of new issuances. The pink line is the
"impiied spread on the 2006-1 AAA ABX, which measures the cost of insuring against
default by AAA tranches of subprime mortgage-backed securities of the first-half-of-
2006 vintage." The spread data are from JP Morgan Chase and not only corroborates
the crisis impression from the quantity side but also makes it clear that the collapse in
quantity is demand rather than supply driven. , • ;.
Figure 3. SCA in the Asset-Backed Securities (ABS) Market
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To conclude, perhaps one of the best indicators of an imminent SFA episode is the large
mismatch between the size of the shock that is "credited" for the contraction and the
value-destruction that takes place in banks' balance sheets. Such mismatch is bound not
only to cause, but also to reflect confusion and fear in financial markets. In Caballero
and Kurlat (2009a) we constructed an estimate of this mismatch, which I reproduce in
18
Figure 4. For this, we computed the evolution of the' market value (equity plus long
term debt) of the major U.S. banks since January 2007.^ From this we obtained an
estimate of total losses on the right hand side of these banks' balance sheets. Absent
any feedback effects, this should be equal to the losses suffered by the assets on the left
hand side of the balance sheet. However, as illustrated in Figure 4, we find that losses
on the right hand side are on the order of three times the IMF's (evolving) estimates of
losses related to mortgage assets accruing to U.S. banks.
^
Figure 4. Losses from Mortgage assets. Total Loss of Market Value and Multiplier.
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Tine procedure for estimating this was as follows; For equity, we simply tracked the evolution of each bank's
market capitalization, excluding increases in the m.arket cap due to issues of new shares. For debt, we estimated
the duration of each bank's long term debt (including any preferred shares) from the maturity profiles described in
the 10-K statements as of December 2007, assuming the interest rate was equal to the rate on lO-year Treasuries
plus the spread on 5-year CDS for each bank, obtained from JPMorgan. Assuming an unchanged maturity profile,
we then tracked the changes in the implied market value of each bank's long term debt on the basis of the
evolution of the CDS spread. The banks included in the calculation are the 19 banks that underwent the "stress
tests" plus Lehman, Bear Stearns, Merrill Lynch, V^achovia, and V^ashington Mutual.
The IMF uses a projection of macroeconomic variables and default rates to estimate losses on loans, and market
values to estimate losses on subprime-related securities. To the extent that market prices of securities overreacted
due to fire sales, our procedure understates the multiplier.
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Sources: IMF Global Financial Stability Reports, banks' financial statements and
JPMorgan, From Caballero and Kurlat (2009a). , ,., -
Beginning in 2008 and increasingly after the fall of Bear Stearns, the overall loss in
market value becomes larger than the losses from subprime assets. The market began
to price in losses from the overall disruption of financial markets, the severe recession
and losses on other types of assets w/hich far exceeded the estimated losses from the
mortgage market itself.
„
-
.
.
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Most of these financial distress indicators were available in real time or shortly
thereafter. By the end of the summer of 2007, they clearly reflected that the potential
for SFA was high. They also showed by the end of the summer of 2008, that a severe SFA
episode was taking place. Policymakers at the Fed and Treasury were acutely aware of
these scenarios, but the treatment options at their disposal were limited by political
constraints and lack of ex-ante preparation.^
ii.D. Treatment
,
'
SCA requires immediate treatment with a defibrillator. That is, an electric shock to the
heart, to restore normal rhythm. This must be done quickly as with every passing
moment there is a steep decline in the chances of SCA survival.
Although less dramatic in its early stages, once SFA reaches full force, the analogy with
SCA and the urgency of its treatment is accurate. This was clearly the case during the
days that followed the Lehman and AIG events, when suddenly even Money Market
funds became entangled and experienced panic-driven withdrawals that clearly had not
been anticipated by policymakers and bankers. Swagel recounted to Bloomberg that on
See Wessel (2009) for a fascinating account of some of the constraints faced by the Fed to act quickly during the
crisis.
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Monday, September 15, the day of Lehman's collapse,' "The general feeling was things
were working." And even as officials and market participants witnessed the run on
money market funds and the drying up of the commercial-paper market -money-
market redemption requests were $33.8 billion that Tuesday, compared to $4.9 billion
the previous week- the full extent of the crisis was still hard to understand (Stewart
2009). In the same Bloomberg article, Mohamed El-Erian recounted "Monday and
Tuesday, people didn't quite see what was happening. ..You had to be on the desk in the
payments and settlements system, cash and collateral, to start seeing cascading market
failures and a complete erosion of trust. ""^^
Essentially, financial defibrillators are large public guarantees of different components
of the financial system's balance sheet. There were many of these put in place in an ad-
hoc basis during the recent crisis. For example, to staunch outflows from money market
funds and stabilize the commercial-paper market, the Treasury created a temporary
insurance program for money-market funds and the Fed created a backstop
commercial-paper facility to purchase highly rated three-month commercial-paper
directly from eligible issuers through a special-purpose vehicle. Through the Term
Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF) program, the Fed provides non-recourse
funding -the non-recourse element is key- for purchases of asset-backed securities.
Deposit insurance on bank accounts (FDIC) was extended (temporarily) from $100,000
to $250,000. The Fed created facilities for lending to investment banks. Later, Morgan
Stanley and Goldman Sachs, the two remaining investment banks, were allowed to
become bank-holding companies to reassure creditors and counterparties. Moreover,
the FDIC, through the Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program, provided guarantees of
newly issued senior unsecured debt of financial institutions. _^- ^
10
Ivry, Bob, Mark Pittman and Christine Harper. 2009. "Sleep-At-Night-Monev Lost in Lehman Lesson
Missing $63 Billion, " Bloomberg.com, September 8.
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Europeans also implemented large public guarantees and interventions. The Asset
Protection Scheme in the UK backed more than half a trillion pounds in post-haircut
assets for RBS and Lloyds. The maturity of discount-window borrowing was extended in
the U.S., the U.K., and the E.U. The UK asset purchase facility acquired commercial-
paper and corporate bonds and the ECB purchased covered bonds. In addition, there
were large capital injections by governments across the globe.
In the U.S., the initial response was ad-hoc, inconsistent and unpredictable. Eventually,
but after much had gone wrong, there was convergence to a consistent policy that
placed panic and the systemic nature of the problem at the core. According to the IMF,
between summer 2007 and June 2009, 49 front-page policy announcements were made
in the U.S., 18 in the U.K., 49 in the Euro area, and 37 more in Japan, Sweden or
Switzerland (IMF 2009). These measures included: interest rate changes; liquidity
support measures such as changing reserve requirements or widening collateral rules;
capital injections; debt guarantees; asset purchases; and asset guarantees. This was the
right response and the steps that followed along the same direction eventually stopped
the economy's free fall and made a recovery possible.
The unfortunate aspect of the process that got us to the right answer is its exasperating
slow speed. For SCA, cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) should be given to a person
having SCA until defibrillation can be done. The equivalent to CPR in the context of SPA
is the ad-hoc and idiosyncratic (as opposed to systemic) policy response to the early
stages of SPA. For emerging market economies, sometimes the CPR-equivalent is all
that is available until an external rescue is mounted. For developed economies the main
obstacle is lack of political support for activating a financial defibrillator. Either way, it is
apparent that in practice too much time is spent in financial-CPR-mode, delaying a much
needed shock treatment.
Another important lesson from SCA treatment is that this is not the time to initiate long
term treatment. The Lehman episode illustrates that similar patience is advisable for
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SFA. Once more quoting Swagel (2009), when the U.S. government allowed Lehman to
fail, "The view at Treasury. ..was that Lehman's management had been given abundant
time to resolve their situation by raising additional capital or selling off the firm, and
market participants were aware of this and had time to prepare." However, it took
"breaking the buck" at just one large money-market fund that was over-exposed to
Lehman for panic to ensue among investors in money market mutual funds, in turn
causing a drying up of short-term financing for banks and corporations. This episode
highlights the extreme fragility of a financial system on the verge of SFA and the
unreasonable risk associated with attempting financial surgery during these episodes."
!LE. Prevention
For low-risk populations, the main preventative prescription is a healthy lifestyle to
address the main factors behind CAD. Economics has an analogous protocol. In
particular, there are two main types of preventive policies often discussed in the context
of financial crises: control of macroeconomic imbalances that can lead to large asset
market crashes; and regulatory controls to limit excessive aggregate risk concentration
in financial balance sheets.
For example, the Treasury department is currently seeking to control macroeconomic
imbalances through its Framework for Sustainable and Balanced Growth, which calls for
monitoring by the IMF. It also has proposed requiring banks to hold higher capital and
liquidity buffers, and for imposing stricter requirements on the largest, most leveraged
and most interconnected firms. It has also proposed a more unified regulatory
approach that would merge the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and the Office of
The Lehman episode highlights the difficulty of predicting the fallout from the resolution of a major financial
institution when the possibility of SFA is impending. There have been several proposals from academia and
policymakers to create mechanisms for orderly resolutions, but resolving a major financial institution, especially
during times of panic, inevitably involves an amount of uncertainty that can easily generate catastrophic
consequences. .,_-
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Thrift Supervision (OTS) into a new National Banl< Supervisor and create a dedicated
agency for consumer protection. ,. , , ,,
.
,., , .,,.
Continuous progress is being made along these dimensions; however, this is a never
ending job, as the financial system adapts to new controls and regulations. Moreover,
there is an aspect of SFA prevention that has received disproportionally little attention:
Hidden financial-CAD detection mechanisms. , ,; . . •
For SAC, there is substantial research effort in developing new tests to detect hidden-
CAD. In the 1990s, doctors found that elevated levels of the C-reactive protein, or CRP,
strongly predict future coronary events. CRP was discovered in 1930 and doctors had
long known that CRP was an indicator to bear in mind, but when its measurement
became more precise, the useful predictive features of CRP became clear. The medical
profession believes a CRP reading in the upper-third versus lower-third of the
distribution implies a relative risk of 2.0 for a future coronary event. However, some
worry that the useful qualities of CRP testing has led doctors to over-emphasize CRP,
when in fact it must be viewed as only one piece of a complex clinical puzzle, a situation
we are quite familiar with in economics. •
The financial equivalent of hidden-CAD derives from the particulars of the evolution of
new connections within the financial network. Tracing and increasing the transparency
of these connections should be a high priority in limiting the possibility of panics. We
still have not found the financial equivalent of CRP testing, but early attempts are
underway to expand our toolkit. As with CRP, making more precise measurements of
financial and other variables we already know to be important, and integrating these
better measurements into our models can help us find predictors of financial distress.
In an October 13, 2008 WSJ article (Summers Outlines Risks to Recovery) there is a quote to Alan Krueger,
assistant Treasury secretary for economic policy, who pointed to a near-complete lack of information on such
critical variables as hedge fund positions, the interconnections among financial institutions and mortgage-
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One interesting first step is Adrian and Brunnermeier's (2009) CoVaR measure of the
value-at-risl< of tlie whole financial system conditional on a given financial institution
being in distress. Adrian and Brunnermeier argue that capital requirements should be
tighter for institutions that can be predicted to have a higher systemic risk contribution
in the future; they find that higher leverage, more maturity mismatch, larger size and
higher book-to-market predict future CoVaR. A related test is the "marginal expected
shortfall" measure proposed by Acharya et al (2009a, b). A firm's marginal expected
shortfall is a measure of losses experienced by the firm conditional on aggregate losses
being large. Acharya and co-authors apply the method using stock prices; that is,
calculating the mean stock return for a given firm conditional on a lower-tail market
return. The "protein" that CoVar and marginal expected shortfall seek to measure is the
conditional correlations between the returns on different firms' assets. CoVaR is a
measure of the response of the firm-j or the system to a shock to firm-i. IVlarginal
expected shortfall is a measure of the response of firm-i to a systemic shock.
Borio and Drehmann (2009) pursue a different type of early-warning system. They seek
to test for the joint presence of two different proteins: aggregate balance-sheet
imbalances and asset-price bubbles. They develop a binary indicator of risk based on
deviations from trend of the quantity of private-sector credit and the prices of equity
and property.
Acharya et al (2009a, b) find that the marginal expected shortfall of a firm measured
during June 2006 to 2007, before the crisis, predicts the firm's return during the crisis.
Borio and Drehmann (2009)'s binary indicator would have reflected heightened risk
prior to the current crisis only for versions that sufficiently emphasize property prices.
Their credit-to-GDP gap had exceeded a strict threshold since 2001, but their equity
refinancing activity. He argued that "...the economic crisis has given an unintended stress test of our economic and
financial indicators."
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price gap was below even a weak threshold for almost a decade before the crisis. The
search for the C-reactive protein of financial CAD is stillin its early stages. ^^ .
On a cautionary note about hidden-financial-CAD, much of the current concern with
large financial institutions (pejoratively referred to as too-big-to-fail or too-
interconnected-to-fail) is the enormous complexity caused by their many linkages. This
view presumes, however, that if these linkages instead were implemented by thousands
of small institutions they would be much less complex and more transparent. I think this
is a fallacy of composition. Indeed, each individual small bank would be simpler, but the
whole network, which is what matters for macroeconomic and financial stability, would
probably be more, not less complex, since it would take many linkages to perform some
of the transactions that are internalized within and through larger institutions.
Moreover, despite the many internal control problems that large institutions exhibit, at
least there is some private-sector party that has some information and incentives to
limit the risks embedded in these internal linkages. It is unlikely that an equivalent
player would do so if all linkages become decentralized. In summary, detecting the
gradual buildup of hidden-CAD probably would be harder rather than simpler in a
financial network with no giant components and many more small nodes.
, .
Finally, as a positive observation, since panic is at the core of SFA, the very existence of a
powerful treatment is preventative in itself. 1 turn to a detailed discussion of this
treatment in the next section.
in. Financial Defibrillators
Monetary policy is the first line of defense when distress arises in the financial system. It
is systemic and quick, and it is an effective instrument for macroeconomic shocks that do
" See Segoviano and Goodhart (2009) for another interesting attempt to measure banking interconnectedness and
stability.
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not trigger significant panics. The next step in policy escalation is one of the oldest
financial defibrillators: the lender of last resort facility (LOLR). It is an insurance
mechanism whose primary role is to prevent depositors' runs from commercial banks.
Bagehot advocated in 1873 that a LOLR should lend in a crisis to "solvent but illiquid"
institutions with adequate collateral. '^^
The LOLR provides a channel and infrastructure that can be used even for situations that
do not exactly match its original intent. In the current crisis, the Fed extended credit
directly to primary dealers and investment banks through the Primary Dealer Credit
Facility (PDCF) and the Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF). The former facility lends
against collateral, using haircuts to assure the safety of the loan and applying an interest
rate above the rate prevailing under normal market conditions. This penalty rate has
succeeded as a built-in exit mechanism for the program. The latter facility is the primary-
dealer analog to the Term Auction Facility (TAF) that serves commercial banks. Under
TSLF, the Fed determines an amount of funding to be provided and an auction
determines the recipients and price of the funding. The Fed also established programs to
serve as a lender of last resort, albeit indirectly, for money-market funds, but these
programs were largely superseded by the Treasury's guarantee program. , ;. l
Aside from the specific value of these extensions of the LOLR, the general principle that I
wish to highlight is that having readily available channels to different segments of the
financial system can save precious time in the midst of a crisis, and is one of the central
arguments supporting the creation of a broader class of financial defibrillators.
The solvency requirement is nice in theory but a real practical problem during an SFA episode. In such instance
the distinction between a solvent and an illiquid institution is highly arbitrary as most asset prices become
uninformative, v^/hich turns the Bagehot principle (i.e., how regulators determine which firms are insolvent) in yet
another source of uncertainty. -^"
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Unfortunately, as starkly illustrated by the recent crisis, even with a flexible
interpretation and use of the conventional LOLR, it can be insufficient when the panic
extends beyond commercial banks and to assets and liabilities other than deposits. In
particular, systemic panic temporarily destroys the value of assets on banks balance
sheets and, more broadly, the collateral of most financial institutions. At distorted asset
prices, capital-adequacy ratio constraints and margin calls trigger costly actions (e.g., fire
sales) and feed back into panic itself. Absent a clear framework to support the financial
system in such scenarios, speculations and misguided policy proposals of all ilk further
add to the uncertainty-fuel, and discourage any private sector participation in the
solution to the crisis. - .
To address these extreme scenarios, not covered by the traditional LOLR, there have
been several recent proposals to provide some form of protection to financial institutions
and markets during systemic events (although many of the proposals do not distinguish
between a systemic event and an individual bank problem, which is a key distinction
from an SFA perspective ). I review some of these in the following sub-sections.
Essentially, there are three broad categories of proposals to reduce crisis risk:
• Self-insurance through higher (and cyclical) capital-adequacy ratios,
• Pre-paid/arranged contingent capital injections,
• Pre-paid/arranged contingent asset and capital insurance injections.
III. A. Self-insurance
This is where policymakers' instinct lies. It essentially consists of requiring banks to
increase their war chests. It is the analogue of requiring that every individual carries an
ICD (implantable cardioverter defibrillator) to prevent SCA.
The Group of Central Bank Governors and Heads of Supervision, the oversight body of
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, has agreed that banks should hold more
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capita! (BIS 2009, Caruana 2009). This Basel group also favors a shift toward higher
"quality" capital; for example, favoring equity over preferred shares. The new/ capital
requirements v^/ould be set with respect to banks' leverage ratios; the coarseness of this
metric is here seen as a virtue. The group also favors countercyclical capital buffers and
liquidity standards for funding operations. The U.S. Treasury has offered similar
recommendations, highlighting an interest in imposing, in the U.S., stricter and more
conservative capital, liquidity and risk management standards on any financial firm
whose combination of size, leverage, and interconnectedness could pose a threat to
financial stability were it to fail (U.S. Treasury 2009).
This category of proposals has the virtue of being the simplest to implement, but has the
drawback of being the costliest. The reason for the latter is that in order to increase
protection against extreme macroeconomic events, it forces banks to freeze capital
which vastly exceeds what they need for their normal, mostly microeconomic risk
management, operations.
.
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Adding a procyclical capital clause, as well as increasing the capital-requirements for
systemically fragile assets relative to idiosyncratically fragile assets, are sound
improvements to the most basic self-insurance systems. However, at the end of the day,
the costly nature of self-insurance caps how much insurance can be mandated through
this mechanism.
.
_
,
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Ili.B. Continaeut cuDftaJ injections
This is where most academics' instinct lies. The basic idea is to reduce the costs
associated with holding capital when it is not needed. However, and centrally, these
approaches recognize that access to capital during crises needs to be arranged in
advance, since it is often hard to raise capital during a severe crisis. Proposals of this
kind differ in the source of this contingent capital, in particular between the private
sector and the government. Within the former, in some proposals the contingent funds
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come primarily from existing stal<etiolders and hence require no "new money" (e.g.,
through contingent debt/equity swaps) while in others the funds come from outsiders.
However, outsiders' commitments problems limit the extent to which the private sector
can serve as the source of this capital during extreme events, a point highlighted by
Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) in theory and AIG (and the monolines) in practice.
Fiannery's (2002) proposal made one of the first significant steps in this direction with
his proposal for "reverse convertible debentures." Such debentures would convert to
equity whenever the market value of a firm's equity falls below a certain threshold.
One problem of this early proposal from the point of view of the systemic problems
addressed in this article is that it made no distinction between aggregate and
idiosyncratic shocks. The Kashyap et al (2008) proposal deals with this distinction and
calls for banks to buy capital insurance policies that pay off when the banking sector
experiences a negative systemic shock. Private investors would underwrite the policies
and place the amount insured into a "lock box" invested in Treasuries. Investors who
are themselves subject to capital requirements would not be allowed to supply this
insurance. The insurance would be triggered when aggregate bank losses over a certain
number of quarters exceed some significant amount; losses at the covered bank would
not be included in determining whether the insurance is triggered.
Combining both contributions, the Squam Lake Working Group on Financial Regulation
has a proposal (2009) similar to Fiannery's except that conversion from debt to equity is
triggered only during systemic events and only for banks that violate certain capital-
adequacy covenants.
Yet another variant on capital insurance is for the insurance policy to pay out to the
regulator, instead of the firm. Under this proposal, by Acharya and others, the amount
of insurance required would be proportional to an estimate of the systemic risk posed
by the bank, in order to discourage firms ex-ante from taking on excessive systemic risk.
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Hart and Zingales (2009) advocate an alternative approach; when spreads on a bank's
CDS rise above a certain threshold, a regulator allows the bank a window of time to
issue equity in order to bring the CDS spread back below the threshold. If the bank is
unable to reduce its CDS spread, the regulator reviews the bank's books and determines
whether or not the bank's debt is at risk. If the regulator determines the bank's debt is
not at risk, the regulator invests in the bank by lending to the bank; otherwise, the
regulator replaces the CEO with a trustee, who will liquidate the bank and pass the
proceeds to the bondholders. Although this approach does have a contingent capital-
injection component, it also relies heavily on the resolution of financial firms, which can
be a useful discipline device during normal times but can be highly counterproductive
during an SFA episode (especially because CDS prices are severely affected by the panic
itself).
More generally, the contingent capital approach is the right one when the crisis is
mostly one of fundamentals. However, if the panic component is significant, a central
feature of an SFA episode, then it is not the most cost-effective, and it may well trigger
further panic as fear of dilution and forced conversion rises. : - '
la.C. Contingent insurance injections '-
The pure panic component of SFA does not require a costly capital injection to subside.
All that is needed is a broad guarantee that resources will be available should conditions
worsen. Despite its high notional value, the expected cost of this policy is low because it
derives its power from tlie very same feature tliat underlies the panic. That is, the
enormous distortion in perceived probabilities of a catastrophe also means that
economic agents greatly overvalue public insurance and guarantees. Providing these can
be as effective as capital injections in dealing with the panic at a fraction of the expected
cost (when assessed at reasonable rather than panic-driven probabilities of a
catastrophe).
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In Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2007) we showed that in an episode of Knightian
uncertainty, a government or central bank concerned with the aggregate will want to
provide insurance against extreme events even if it has no informational advantage over
the private sector. The reason is that during a panic of this kind, each individual bank
and investor fears to be in a situation worse than the average, an event that cannot be
true for the collective. By providing a broad guarantee, the government gets the private
sector to react more than one-for-one with this guarantee since it also closes the gap
between the true average and the average of panic-driven expectations.
During the recent crisis, there were many asset-insurance injection proposals. "^^ The
argument for why it may be optimal to support assets rather than inject capital during
panics is developed in Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2008b). In practice, financial
institutions face a constraint such that value-at-risk must be less than some multiple of
equity. In normal times, this structure speaks to the power of equity injections, since
these are "multiplied" many times in relaxing the value-at-risk constraint. In contrast,
insuring assets reduces value-at-risk by reducing risk directly, which typically does not
involve a multiplier. However, when uncertainty is rampant, some illiquid and complex
assets, such as CDOs and CDO-squared, can reverse this calculation. In such cases,
insuring the uncertainty-creating assets reduces risk by multiples, and frees capital,
more effectively than directly injecting equity capital.
Moreover, it turns out that the same principle of insurance-injection can be used to
recapitalize banks when that's the chosen solution. Rather than directly injecting capital,
the government can pledge a minimum future price guarantee for newly privately raised
capital (Caballero 2009a). This mechanism is very powerful both because private
investors overvalue the guarantee, and because the recapitalization itself makes the
catastrophic event less likely. Caballero and Kurlat (2009b) quantified this mechanism
and showed that once the equilibrium response of equity prices is taken into account,
See, e.g., Caballero (2009a, b); Mehrling and Milne (2008) and Milne (2009) for real time proposals.
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this mechanism significantly reduces the effective exJDOsure of government resources
relative to a public equity injection.
Many of the actual programs implemented during the crisis had elements of guarantees
rather than being pure capital injections. Perhaps the clearest case of this approach is
that follovi/ed by the UK. Their asset protection scheme, announced in January 2009,
provided insurance against 90 percent of losses above a "first-loss" threshold on
portfolios of corporate and leveraged loans, commercial and residential property loans,
and structured credit assets such as RMBS, CMBS, CLO, and CDO obligations. The
insurance is provided in exchange for a fee. The APS covered £552 billion portfolios of
RBS and Lloyds Banking Group, w/ith a first-loss amount of £19.5 billion and £25 billion,
respectively. The main criticism to the U.K.'s approach is that they charged such a high
fee for the insurance that most banks chose not to engage, leaving the overall economy
more exposed to their failure than socially optimal.''^ "
In Caballero and Kurlat (2009a) we proposed a policy framework which would not only
guarantee access to insurance in the event of an SFA episode, but it would do so in a
•flexible manner that integrates the role of the government as an insurer of last resort
with private sector information on the optimal allocation of contingent insurance.
Under our proposal, the government would issue tradable insurance credits (TICs) which
would be purchased by financial institutions, some of which would have minimum
holding requirements. During a systemic crisis, each TIC would entitle its holder to
attach a government guarantee to some of its assets. All regulated financial institutions
would be allowed to hold and use TICs, and possibly hedge funds, private equity funds,
and corporations as well. In principle, TICs could be used as a flexible and readily
available substitute for many of the facilities that were created during the crisis.
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This is a reminder that a taxpayers' "deal mentality" during an SFA episode can be highly counterproductive
(Caballero 2009c). Also, it is important to note that each bank is more likely to know its own financial health and
hence be less affected by Knightian uncertainty with respect to its own financial health than are their creditors. For
this reason, a bank may reject an expensive insurance deal even when outsiders faced with the same option would
accept it.
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There are five features of the TIC-framework which are worth highlighting at this point;
• It is automatic. While the precise threshold that defines the crisis is fuzzy, as in
practice is that which determines the trigger for the Fed's unusual and exigent
circumstances clause, once triggered the actions are well defined, broad, and
easy to communicate to the public and financial institutions in advance/^
• it addresses directiy the muitipie-effects of panic on asset values and financial
balance sheets. While the conventional LLOR is aimed at protecting the banks'
ability to generate liabilities, the TIC framework protects assets and through it
capital. For example, during the recent crisis the Fed relaxed the constraints on
the type of assets it accepts in its discount window operations. This was
extremely useful but it only addressed the effect of uncertainty on funding but
not on capital constraints. Instead a TIC would have addressed both
simultaneously.
.
• It is contingent on a systemic crisis. TICs are equivalent to CDS during systemic
crises but not during normal times. That is, TICs are contingent-CDS. They
become activated only when a systemic crisis arises. By targeting the event that
needs protection, this contingent feature significantly lowers the cost of
insurance for financial institutions.
• It is flexible. Which asset classes TICs are attached to depend on where the
largest panic discounts take place on a specific crisis. This feature may raise
concerns that banks will select their assets based on insider's knowledge of
expected losses rather than on panic discounts, but this adverse selection
If there is a concern tiiat TICs will be activated too frequently without sufficient evidence of systemic
risk, one could contemplate making activation subject to several "keys," as with the systemic risk
exemption in FDICIA (i.e, the President has to sign off, 2/3 of the Fed board has to sign off, and 2/3 of the
FDIC has to sign off). I owe this example to Morris Goldstein.
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problem can be limited with methods similar to those used by the Collateral
Management System (CMS) for discount borrowing, supplemented with
Representations and Warranties clauses.
• TICs are tradable. This feature allows private agents to use markets to reallocate
the access to insurance toward financial institutions in most dire need. And if
distressed institutions chose to not seek to stock up on TICs and risk their
survival for a higher return (as Lehman probably did and failed), at the very least
the rest of the financial system would be better protected against the turmoil
that could arise if the misbehaving institutions fail as they would be holding the
TICs.
Of course some of these basic properties can be modified depending on the specific
circumstances and complementary measures available. Tradability clearly has pros and
cons, and it could be done without it. Also, while the basic mechanism would consist of
attaching TICs to assets, variants could include attaching them to liabilities and even
equity, depending on the particular needs of the distressed institutions and markets,
and they could also operate as collateral-enhancers for discount window borrowing. If
the adverse selection effect is deemed to be overwhelming in a specific context, this can
be controlled by narrowing the flexibility on the assets than can be protected by TICs."^^
iV. The International Dimension
The international dimension of SFA adds its own ingredients. I focus on the problem for
emerging markets which has a close parallel with the issues faced by the financial sector
within developed economies.
In Caballero and Kurlat (2009a) we argued that TICs would iiave been an effective policy tool to address the
recent crisis and provided an illustrative example of how these could have been used.
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Financial crises in emerging markets are greatly amplified, indeed in many instances are
caused, by a sudden stop and reversal of capital inflows (the so called "sudden stops").
This phenomenon enormously complicates the policy problem, since rather than
providing the solution, the government itself often becomes entangled in the crisis. In
Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001, 2006), we refer to this as the dual-liquidity problem
of emerging markets; The shortage is one of international rather than (just) domestic
liquidity, which means that the local government may not have access to the right kind
of financial-defibrillator when coping with large capital outflows."'^
Most policymakers in emerging market economies are acutely aware of this danger,
which is one of the main reasons they accumulate large amounts of international
reserves. Large accumulations of reserves are the equivalent to self-insurance for
domestic banks, and as such are costly insurance facilities (although less so when they
are the side effect of exchange rate intervention policies). For this reason, many of us
have advocated the use of different external insurance arrangements, and the IMF has
spent a significant amount of time attempting to design the right contingent credit line
facility.
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While European banks also experienced a currency mismatch problem at some stage during the recent crisis,
this was expediently solved by a swap mechanism between the Fed and the ECB. The Fed also established dollar
liquidity swap lines with the central banks of Australia, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, the United Kingdom (BOE), Japan,
Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Singapore, Sweden, and Switzerland. The swap lines with the ECB and Swiss
National Bank were established on December 12, 2007, and the others were established subsequently. In
addition, the Fed established foreign-currency liquidity swap lines with the BOE, the ECB, the BOJ, and the Swiss
National Bank, should the Fed need to borrow foreign currency in the future. A far more problematic issue for
these economies is the political concerns that arise from utilizing domestic financial-defibrillators when there is
significant cross-border interconnectedness among their financial systems. In this context there is a free-rider
problem which further delays an already slow policy response during SFA episodes. This coordination problem can
be reduced through different international conferences such as the G7 or others, which is the mechanism used for
most other macroeconomic policy coordination issues. This process can be further facilitated by having cross-
pledges proportional to these cross-border exposures. That is, the U.K. would stand behind a share of the U.S. TICs,
were these to be activated, and vice-versa.
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Since 1999 three different contingent lending facilities have been introduced by the
IMF: the Contingent Credit Lines (CCL), the Short Term Liquidity Facility (SLF), and the
Flexible Credit Lines (FCL). They all share the same basic premise; increase eligibility
requirements ex-ante in order to provide reduced conditionality ex-post. The CCL v^/as
allovued to expire in 2003 and the SLF, introduced in October 2008, was replaced by the
FCL in March 2009. Both the CCL and the SLF failed to attract a single borrower request.
The reluctance of the targeted emerging economies to join these facilities resulted in
consecutive re-designs that provided more appealing terms. In November 2000, the
CCL's conditions for activation were simplified to enhance automaticity; the rate of
charge and the commitment fee were also reduced. Under the SLF ex-post
conditionality was further reduced. The FCL increased the size of the committed
resources to 10 times the member's quota (compared to 3-5 under the CCL and SLF) and
extended the repayment period to 3.5 to 5 years (compared to 3 months under the SLF).
It is not clear whether it was the redesign or the fact that countries were in the middle
of the global crisis when they signed on, but by now several of them have joined:
Mexico ($47 billion), Poland ($21 billion), and Colombia ($11 billion), are currently
enrolled in the FCL. The FCL is the right kind of facility for SFA, since it is not a contingent
capital injection but a contingent insurance injection (it gives the right to a credit line
during crises).
The IMF's FCL is the equivalent to a LOLR for sovereigns. As such, it addresses some but
not all the effects of a widespread panic on the country's ability to tap global capital
markets during a global SFA episode. There is scope for complementary facilities.
At the beginning of the millennium 1 was asked to write an article on "The Future of the
IMF" for an AEA session (Caballero 2003). Uncomfortable with the broad mandate, I
began by changing the meaning of the IMF acronym to that of "International Markets
Facilitator." Basically, the idea was to have a division of the (original) IMF play the role
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of a (well capitalized) AIG or monoline in insuring CDOs of contingent emerging market
debt. Countries would issue debt with contingencies that would insulate them from
their main real and financial external into a CDO, and the IMF would add insurance to
the senior tranches of these CDOs. The IMF's wrapping would serve both the role of
signaling to the market the soundness of the underlying assets and it would lower the
effective cost for emerging markets to buy external insurance. "° This would be a sort of
PPIP for sovereigns, which would leverage IMF's anti-crisis resources.
The sudden stop phenomenon is just one more manifestation of the flight of quality
mechanism that can be triggered by conventional financial multipliers and greatly
exacerbated by SFA. As such, it would make sense to develop a system akin to the TIC
framework but customized to contain the effect of panic on the value of emerging
market new and legacy emerging debt held by investors during global SFA episodes.
There is extensive evidence that severe non-idiosyncratic sudden stops are caused by
runs against emerging markets as an asset class (see, e.g., Broner et al. 2008). By
insuring these assets during a crisis, they would become part of "quality" and hence
limit the run against them.
These E-TICs (emerging markets TICs) would typically be activated at the same time as
TICs, but there could be other instances when both decouple. For this reason they
should be controlled by a global institution such as the IMF rather than by the
governments of the U.S. or other developed economies.
V. Conclusions
To recap, the absence of systemic insurance is a very weak incentive mechanism during
the boom and an economic tragedy during a financial crisis. A pragmatic anti-crisis
'" See Cabaliero and Panageas (2007, 2008) for models and calibrations of the hedging gains for emerging markets
subject to sudden stops in net capital inflows and terms of trade shocks.
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system needs to complement regulatory constraints (healthy financial lifestyle
guidelines) during the boom with an institutionalized systemic insurance arrangement for
crises (a readily available financial defibrillator).
The standard LOLR should be complemented with three kinds of anti-crisis mechanisms:
• Self-insurance through higher (and cyclical) capital-adequacy ratios,
• Pre-paid/arranged contingent capital injections, and
• Pre-paid/arranged contingent asset and capital insurance injections.
In practice, there are good reasons to have some of each of these types of mechanisms.
For small shocks, it is probably easiest to have banks self-insure. For large shocks, there is
always a fundamental component, which is probably best addressed immediately with
contingent capital. However, the large panic component of an SFA episode requires large
amounts of guarantees, which would be highly impractical and costly to achieve through
capital injections. For this component, a contingent-insurance policy is the appropriate
response. '' .> "i- • / ': ;;-..,-'?-'
The same principles carry over to the international arena, especially for emerging market
economies, where the sovereign itself is at risk of becoming embroiled in an SFA event.
The IMF has an important role to play in facilitating contingent insurance arrangements
for these economies. ,
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